Trade reduction vs. multi-stage: a comparison of double auction design approaches

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2006.04.015MaRDI QIDQ869603zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Leon Yang Chu, Zuo-Jun (Max) Shen

Publication date 8 March 2007

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2006.04.015

zbMATH Keywords

double auctionmechanism designstrategy-proof mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90B99)

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• Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency

Cites work

• A dominant strategy double auction
• Agent competition double-auction mechanism
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1947406 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2243363 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentives in Teams
• Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market

Cited in

(1)

• Design for optimized multi-lateral multi-commodity markets

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