Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.03.014zbMATH Open1296.91131OpenAlexW2133410115MaRDI QIDQ2016235FDOQ2016235

Steven R. Williams, Konstantinos E. Zachariadis, Mark Allen Satterthwaite

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.014

zbMATH Keywords

double auctioncorrelated valuesdesigned mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Cites Work

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Cited In (2)

• Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade
• Trade reduction vs. multi-stage: a comparison of double auction design approaches

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