Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.03.014MaRDI QIDQ2016235zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Steven R. Williams, Konstantinos E. Zachariadis, Mark Allen Satterthwaite

Publication date 19 June 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.014

zbMATH Keywords

double auctioncorrelated valuesdesigned mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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• The Optimality of a Simple Market Mechanism
• Approximately Efficient Double Auctions with Strong Budget Balance
• Truthful Double Auction Mechanisms
• Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency
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Cites work

• A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
• A dominant strategy double auction
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• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
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• The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms
• The robustness of the independent private value model in Bayesian mechanism design
• Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium

Cited in

(7)

• Truthful Double Auction Mechanisms
• Dynamic double auctions: toward first best
• Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade
• Trade reduction vs. multi-stage: a comparison of double auction design approaches
• Fixed price approximability of the optimal gain from trade
• The exposure problem and market design
• The Optimality of a Simple Market Mechanism

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