Double auction with interdependent values: Incentives and efficiency

DOI10.3982/TE2275zbMath1396.91258MaRDI QIDQ4682795

Fuhito Kojima, Takuro Yamashita

Publication date: 19 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

double auctionasymptotic efficiencyinterdependent valuesex post incentive compatibilitymulti-unit demand and supply

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets ⋮ On nondegenerate equilibria of double auctions with several buyers and a price floor ⋮ Optimal information structures in bilateral trade ⋮ Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence ⋮ Double auctions with no-loss constrained traders

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