Dynamic Double Auctions: Toward First Best
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Publication:5106370
DOI10.1287/opre.2022.2266zbMath1500.91074OpenAlexW4225440288MaRDI QIDQ5106370
Renato Paes Leme, Song Zuo, Santiago R. Balseiro, Vahab S. Mirrokni
Publication date: 19 September 2022
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2022.2266
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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