A dominant strategy double auction
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Publication:1190252
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90091-UzbMath0763.90036WikidataQ29541222 ScholiaQ29541222MaRDI QIDQ1190252
Publication date: 27 September 1992
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
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- Efficient allocation with continuous quantities
- Uses of exchangeability
- The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
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