A dominant strategy double auction

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Publication:1190252

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90091-UzbMath0763.90036WikidataQ29541222 ScholiaQ29541222MaRDI QIDQ1190252

R. Preston McAfee

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)




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