Groves mechanisms and communication externalities

DOI10.1007/s10058-015-0180-yzbMath1349.91115OpenAlexW2148988053WikidataQ59479212 ScholiaQ59479212MaRDI QIDQ283181

Efthymios Athanasiou, Giacomo Valletta, Santanu S. Dey

Publication date: 13 May 2016

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-015-0180-y

zbMATH Keywords

budget surplus or deficitexternalityGroves mechanismsPareto undominated mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

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• Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
• The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project
• Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
• A dominant strategy double auction
• A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good
• Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms
• Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices
• Serial Cost Sharing
• Incentives in Teams
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
• Undominated Groves Mechanisms

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