The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large
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Publication:3468839
DOI10.2307/2297496zbMath0693.90017OpenAlexW2031865970MaRDI QIDQ3468839
Steven R. Williams, Mark Allen Satterthwaite
Publication date: 1989
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/741.pdf
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