Information precision and asymptotic efficiency of industrial markets

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.04.010zbMath1142.91648OpenAlexW3122703731MaRDI QIDQ932770

Tunay I. Tunca

Publication date: 11 July 2008

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://archive.nyu.edu/handle/2451/28406

zbMATH Keywords

private informationbilateral oligopolylarge marketsprice-taking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Trade models (91B60)

Cites Work

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