Incentive compatibility and competitive allocations
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Publication:2366945
Cites work
Cited in
(28)- Conflicting interests, decomposability and comparative statics
- Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability
- Informational robustness of competitive equilibria.
- Approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies
- Purification of incentive compatible allocations
- Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms
- Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing
- Efficiency of the rank-order incentive systems
- Competing allocation principles: time for compromise?
- Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints
- Recent studies of agent incentives in Internet resource allocation and pricing
- Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments
- Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
- Envy-freeness and implementation in large economies
- Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities
- About incentives distribution
- On Incentive Compatible Competitive Selection Protocol
- Investment and Competitive Matching
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3993287 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentive Compatibility on the Blockchain
- A note on the incentive compatible core
- Balanced equilibrium in pseudo-markets with endowments
- A Walrasian mechanism with markups for nonconvex markets
- Monotone strategyproofness
- Intertemporal incentive allocation in simple hierarchies
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Ex ante efficiency implies incentive compatibility
- Information precision and asymptotic efficiency of industrial markets
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