Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2044984
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105274zbMath1470.91134arXiv1908.04336OpenAlexW3163663315MaRDI QIDQ2044984
Jun Zhang, Federico Echenique, Antonio Miralles
Publication date: 11 August 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.04336
Related Items (4)
Trading probabilities along cycles ⋮ Constrained random matching ⋮ Balanced equilibrium in pseudo-markets with endowments ⋮ Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
- Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
- House allocation with fractional endowments
- The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments
- An equilibrium existence theorem for a general model without ordered preferences
- On cores and indivisibility
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- Ex-ante efficiency in assignments with seniority rights
- Incentive compatibility and competitive allocations
- Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- How to Divide When There Isn't Enough
- Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange
- Fair Net Trades
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
This page was built for publication: Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints
