Ex-ante efficiency in assignments with seniority rights

DOI10.1007/S10058-016-0196-YMaRDI QIDQ2318115zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Antonio Miralles

Publication date 13 August 2019

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-016-0196-y

zbMATH Keywords

\textit{ex-ante} efficiencyconsistencyrandom assignmentsequential pseudomarket

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• Efficient assignment respecting priorities
• A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
• Efficient priority rules

Cites work

• A theory of school-choice lotteries
• Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model
• Consistent Solutions in Atomless Economies
• Continuity and uniqueness of equilibria for linear exchange economies
• Strategy-proofness in the large
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods

Cited in

(2)

• Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints
• Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources

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