Ex-ante efficiency in assignments with seniority rights

DOI10.1007/s10058-016-0196-yzbMath1422.91555OpenAlexW2569563976MaRDI QIDQ2318115

Antonio Miralles

Publication date: 13 August 2019

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-016-0196-y

zbMATH Keywords

consistencyrandom assignment\textit{ex-ante} efficiencysequential pseudomarket

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (2)

Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources ⋮ Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints

Cites Work

• Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
• A theory of school-choice lotteries
• Strategy-proofness in the Large
• Consistent Solutions in Atomless Economies
• Continuity and uniqueness of equilibria for linear exchange economies

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