A theory of school-choice lotteries
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Publication:4586013
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- Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak
- Cognitive ability and games of school choice
- School choice with vouchers
- A note on ex-ante stable lotteries
- On the set of many-to-one strongly stable fractional matchings
- How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field
- Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets
- Tie-breaking and efficiency in the laboratory school choice
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
- Constrained random matching
- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation
- Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities
- What matters in school choice tie-breaking? How competition guides design
- Self-selection in school choice
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
- Ex-ante efficiency in assignments with seniority rights
- Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts
- Efficient rules for probabilistic assignment
- Efficient lottery design
- Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- Parallel markets in school choice
- The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints
- Fair implementation of diversity in school choice
- Improving community cohesion in school choice via correlated-lottery implementation
- Lotteries in student assignment: an equivalence result
- An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
- Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
- Efficient Fair Division with Minimal Sharing
- Fractional matching markets
- Stable matching in large economies
- Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission
- Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems
- Distance on matchings: An axiomatic approach
- The fractional Boston random assignment rule and its axiomatic characterization
- Fairness and efficiency of the random serial dictatorship on preference domains with a tier structure
- On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking
- A theory of fair random allocation under priorities
- Minimal-access rights in school choice and the deferred acceptance mechanism
- Characterizing a probabilistic version of the Boston mechanism under weak priorities
- A limit to envy in large matching markets with incomplete information
- Impossibility results for weak strategy-proofness and respect for improvements in random assignment with priorities
- Rituals of reason: experimental evidence on the social acceptability of lotteries in allocation problems
- On the decomposability of fractional allocations
- Ex-post stability under two-sided matching: complexity and characterization
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