Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.12.001zbMath1347.91203OpenAlexW3122767435MaRDI QIDQ5964688

Kemal Yıldız, Battal Doğan

Publication date: 1 March 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/23591

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityefficiencymarriage problemsprobabilistic assignment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (8)

The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints ⋮ Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities ⋮ Stable fractional matchings ⋮ Fractional matching markets ⋮ A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism ⋮ Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching ⋮ Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts

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