Efficiency under a combination of ordinal and cardinal information on preferences
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Recommendations
- Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
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Cites work
- A constructive proof of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- An efficiency theorem for incompletely known preferences
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3095897 (Why is no real title available?)
- Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
- Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
- Random serial dictatorship and ordinally efficient contracts
- Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?
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