Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?
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Publication:840694
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2009.05.003zbMath1195.91119OpenAlexW2043613503MaRDI QIDQ840694
Publication date: 14 September 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.05.003
Related Items (21)
Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms ⋮ Efficient lottery design ⋮ Trading probabilities along cycles ⋮ Fair solutions to the random assignment problem ⋮ Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism ⋮ An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism ⋮ Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach ⋮ Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains ⋮ Beyond the worst-case analysis of random priority: smoothed and average-case approximation ratios in mechanism design ⋮ Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation ⋮ Bounded incentives in manipulating the probabilistic serial rule ⋮ The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods ⋮ The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach ⋮ An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism ⋮ Assigning agents to a line ⋮ When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free? ⋮ Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching ⋮ Efficiency under a combination of ordinal and cardinal information on preferences ⋮ The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments ⋮ Efficient rules for probabilistic assignment ⋮ Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
Cites Work
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
- Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
- A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
- Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
- House allocation with existing tenants
- On cores and indivisibility
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Kidney Exchange
- Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
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