Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?
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Publication:840694
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Cites work
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
- House allocation with existing tenants
- Kidney Exchange
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- On cores and indivisibility
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
- Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
Cited in
(25)- Fair solutions to the random assignment problem
- Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach
- Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching
- Trading probabilities along cycles
- Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains
- Efficient rules for probabilistic assignment
- Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
- Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
- Efficient lottery design
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- Beyond the worst-case analysis of random priority: smoothed and average-case approximation ratios in mechanism design
- An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism
- The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
- An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Assigning agents to a line
- When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?
- Efficiency under a combination of ordinal and cardinal information on preferences
- Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation
- Bounded incentives in manipulating the probabilistic serial rule
- A theory of fair random allocation under priorities
- Egalitarian random assignment
- On (constrained) efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment
- Neighborhood top trading cycles
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
- The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments
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