Fair solutions to the random assignment problem
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Publication:1633672
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.02.006zbMath1418.91262OpenAlexW2325649278WikidataQ130108116 ScholiaQ130108116MaRDI QIDQ1633672
Publication date: 20 December 2018
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/286551/5/fairlotteries.pdf
Walrasian equilibriumprobabilistic serialsd-efficiencysd-core from equal divisionsd-envy-freenesssd-equal-division-lower-bound
Inequalities; stochastic orderings (60E15) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (3)
Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation ⋮ Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment ⋮ Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem
Cites Work
- Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: a generalization of the serial rule and its characterization
- House allocation with fractional endowments
- Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
- Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?
- A constructive proof of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem
- Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment
- Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
- Efficient lottery design
- Lotteries in student assignment: An equivalence result
- The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
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