Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: a generalization of the serial rule and its characterization
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Publication:462853
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.08.003zbMath1308.91095MaRDI QIDQ462853
Publication date: 22 October 2014
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.08.003
consistencysd-efficiencygeneralized serial rulelimited invariancesd normalized-no-envysd proportional-division lower-bound
90B80: Discrete location and assignment
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
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