Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem
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Cites work
- A characterization of the extended serial correspondence
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
- A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
- Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
- Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
- Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences
- Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object
- Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule
- Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: a generalization of the serial rule and its characterization
- Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
- Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
- When are local incentive constraints sufficient?
Cited in
(8)- On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions
- Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: two impossibility results
- Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
- Random assignments with uniform preferences: an impossibility result
- Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
- Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties
- A new impossibility result for random assignments
- Stochastic same-sidedness in the random voting model
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