On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions
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Publication:2668984
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102593zbMath1485.91091OpenAlexW3112814884MaRDI QIDQ2668984
Souvik Roy, Soumyarup Sadhukhan
Publication date: 9 March 2022
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/104405/1/MPRA_paper_104405.pdf
strategy-proofnesselementary monotonicityunanimityblock monotonicitymulti-swap monotonicityupper contour strategy-proofness
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