On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
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Cites work
- A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
- A geometric proof of Gibbard's random dictatorship theorem
- A new informational base for social choice
- A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
- Aggregation of partial rankings, \(p\)-ratings and top-\(m\) lists
- An extreme point characterization of random strategy-proof social choice functions: the two alternative case
- Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
- Consistent probabilistic social choice
- Decomposing random mechanisms
- Dictatorial domains
- Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5556709 (Why is no real title available?)
- Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
- Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms
- Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains
- Random dictatorship domains
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- Single-peaked orders on a tree
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- Strategy-proof allotment rules
- Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes
- Strategy-proof partitioning
- Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
- Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods.
- Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains
- Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
- Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences
- The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
- Tops-only domains
- Voting by Committees
- Voting by committees under constraints
- Voting under constraints
- When are local incentive constraints sufficient?
Cited in
(22)- The decomposition of strategy-proof random social choice functions on dichotomous domains
- Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences
- Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains
- On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
- A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules
- A characterization of random min-max domains and its applications
- On single-peaked domains and min-max rules
- Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains
- Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system
- Local global equivalence for unanimous social choice functions
- On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions
- An extreme point characterization of random strategy-proof social choice functions: the two alternative case
- On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
- Unanimous and strategy-proof probabilistic rules for single-peaked preference profiles on graphs
- Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
- Formation of committees through random voting rules
- Uniform random dictatorship: a characterization without strategy-proofness
- The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules
- Tops-only domains
- Stochastic same-sidedness in the random voting model
- The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences
- On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem
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