On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
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Publication:1753301
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.011zbMath1390.91128OpenAlexW2187540458MaRDI QIDQ1753301
Shurojit Chatterji, Huaxia Zeng
Publication date: 29 May 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1777
strategy-proofnessunanimityrandom social choice functionsexterior propertythe interior propertytops-only property
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