Local global equivalence for unanimous social choice functions
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:2667256)
Recommendations
- Local‐global equivalence in voting models: A characterization and applications
- Local vs. global strategy-proofness: a new equivalence result for ordinal mechanisms
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions
- Unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains
Cites work
- A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
- Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
- On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
- Single-peaked orders on a tree
- Tops-only domains
- When are local incentive constraints sufficient?
Cited in
(7)- Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains
- Local vs. global strategy-proofness: a new equivalence result for ordinal mechanisms
- On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions
- Local‐global equivalence in voting models: A characterization and applications
- Unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains
- The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules
- Strategy-proof preference aggregation and the anonymity-neutrality tradeoff
This page was built for publication: Local global equivalence for unanimous social choice functions
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2667256)
