Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance

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A new approach to the implementation problem
Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
Manipulation and the Pareto rule
Randomized preference aggregation: Additivity of power and strategy proofness
Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions
Double deception: Two against one in three-person games
Multivalued social choice functions and strategic manipulation with counterthreats
Threats, counter-threats and strategic manipulation for non-binary group decision rules
Outcomes of admissible Nash equilibria and sophisticated voting when decisions are based on pairwise comparisons
Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions
A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium
Preference aggregation with randomized social orderings
The role of ambiguity in manipulating voter behavior
A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions
Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
Probabilistic, fuzzy and rough concepts in social choice
Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach
On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness
Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders
The impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences
Fractional group identification
The decomposition of strategy-proof random social choice functions on dichotomous domains
Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers
Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization
Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
Matching with indifferences: a comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation
House allocation with existing tenants
Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results
Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods.
Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures
Random dictatorship domains
Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting
Allan Gibbard
Ordinally Bayesian incentive compatible probabilistic voting rules
Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects
Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences
Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains
Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
Local vs. global strategy-proofness: a new equivalence result for ordinal mechanisms
The capacity constrained facility location problem
A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules
Inefficiencies on linking decisions
A characterization of random min-max domains and its applications
A theory of sticky rents: search and bargaining with incomplete information
What proportion of sincere voters guarantees efficiency?
Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
Fair sharing under dichotomous preferences
Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria
Manipulability of consular election rules
Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains
Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
Strategy-proof preference aggregation: possibilities and characterizations
Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains
On the fairness of random procedures
Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good
Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences
Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system
Local global equivalence for unanimous social choice functions
An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes
On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions
Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties
Portioning using ordinal preferences: fairness and efficiency
The nonmanipulative vote-deficits of voting rules
Towards a general and unified characterization of individual and collective choice functions under fuzzy and nonfuzzy preferences and majority via the ordered weighted average operators
The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences
False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives
Random aggregation without the Pareto principle
Manipulation in elections with uncertain preferences
An extreme point characterization of random strategy-proof social choice functions: the two alternative case
Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule
On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
Condorcet-consistent and approximately strategyproof tournament rules
Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions
Automated reasoning in social choice theory: some remarks
Parametrized algorithms for random serial dictatorship
Unanimous and strategy-proof probabilistic rules for single-peaked preference profiles on graphs
Strategic voting under uncertainty about the voting method
Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
Manipulation of k-approval under de re knowledge
On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions
On the welfare of cardinal voting mechanisms
Formation of committees through random voting rules
Social Choice Theory
An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains
A new perspective on implementation by voting trees
Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms
Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures
On guarantees, vetoes, and random dictators
Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
Uniform random dictatorship: a characterization without strategy-proofness
Committee formation under constraints through randomized voting rules on separable domains
The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules
Truthful facility assignment with resource augmentation: an exact analysis of serial dictatorship
Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences
Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model

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