What proportion of sincere voters guarantees efficiency?

DOI10.1007/S00355-019-01184-8MaRDI QIDQ2325660zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Yasunori Okumura

Publication date 27 September 2019

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01184-8

zbMATH Keywords

Borda rulehybrid voting modelPareto efficiencyplurality rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections
• Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context
• Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
• Does uncertainty lead to sincerity? Simple and complex voting mechanisms
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules
• Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting
• Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
• Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The Borda Rule and Pareto Stability: A Comment

Cited in

(3)

• The Pareto rule and strategic voting
• Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting
• The strategic sincerity of approval voting

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