Fully sincere voting

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.01.001MaRDI QIDQ1036599zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alexander Wolitzky

Publication date 13 November 2009

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.01.001

zbMATH Keywords

social choice theorystrategy-proofnessvoting theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting
• The strategic sincerity of approval voting
• Does uncertainty lead to sincerity? Simple and complex voting mechanisms
• Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences
• Strategy stability and sincerity in approval voting

Cites work

• A note on randomized social choice and random dictatorships
• Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
• Distribution of Power under Stochastic Social Choice Rules
• Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Social choice and individual values
• Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
• Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
• Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
• Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
• Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The representative agent model of probabilistic social choice

Cited in

(5)

• Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences
• Two field experiments on approval voting in Germany
• The strategic sincerity of approval voting
• Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting
• What proportion of sincere voters guarantees efficiency?

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