Distribution of Power under Stochastic Social Choice Rules
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Publication:3730300
DOI10.2307/1912843zbMath0596.90009OpenAlexW1971882802MaRDI QIDQ3730300
Prasanta K. Pattanaik, Bezalel Peleg
Publication date: 1986
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912843
regularityindependence of irrelevant alternativesex-post Pareto optimalityprobabilistic voting procedurestochastic social choice rulesweighted random dictatorship
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