Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule
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Publication:449195
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.013zbMath1247.91089OpenAlexW3124821277MaRDI QIDQ449195
Anna Bogomolnaia, Eun Jeong Heo
Publication date: 12 September 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.013
Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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