Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment
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Publication:1697833
DOI10.1007/s00355-017-1059-3zbMath1392.91100OpenAlexW2619395542MaRDI QIDQ1697833
Publication date: 20 February 2018
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1059-3
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