On popular random assignments

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_16MaRDI QIDQ2856142zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, Paul Stursberg

Publication date 23 October 2013

Published in Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_16

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

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Cited in

(8)

• Minimal envy and popular matchings
• Finding and Recognizing Popular Coalition Structures
• Fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences
• Popularity, Mixed Matchings, and Self-Duality
• Welfare maximization entices participation
• Fairness in Influence Maximization through Randomization
• Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment
• Strategy-proof popular mechanisms

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