Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment
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Cites work
- A characterization of the extended serial correspondence
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- Algorithms and Computation
- Assignment Problem Based on Ordinal Preferences
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
- Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model
- Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences
- Fair division under ordinal preferences: computing envy-free allocations of indivisible goods
- House allocation with existing tenants
- House allocation with fractional endowments
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078983 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3095897 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- On popular random assignments
- Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences
- Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule
- Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: a generalization of the serial rule and its characterization
- Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules
- Queue allocation of indivisible goods
- Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects
- Random assignment under weak preferences
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
- The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments
- Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
Cited in
(20)- Impossibility results for choice correspondences
- Fair solutions to the random assignment problem
- Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach
- Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object
- Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable
- Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules
- Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem
- Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences
- When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof?
- Notions of anonymity for object assignment: impossibility theorems
- Multi resource allocation with partial preferences
- An impossibility theorem for allocation aggregation
- Evaluating assignment without transfers: a market perspective
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3057871 (Why is no real title available?)
- An étude in modeling the definability of equilibrium
- On existence of truthful fair cake cutting mechanisms
- Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment
- A new impossibility result for random assignments
- Allocation without transfers: a welfare-maximizing mechanism under incomplete information
- Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model
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