Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism

DOI10.3982/TE1010zbMATH Open1395.91264OpenAlexW1548481276MaRDI QIDQ4586003FDOQ4586003

Authors: Tadashi Hashimoto, Daisuke Hirata, Onur Kesten, Morimitsu Kurino, M. Utku Ünver 

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1010

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zbMATH Keywords

probabilistic serialrandom assignmentsd-efficiencyweak invariancesd-envy-freenessweak truncation robustnessordinal fairness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cited In (54)

• On slots' scheduling
• A theory of fair random allocation under priorities
• Characterizing a probabilistic version of the Boston mechanism under weak priorities
• Ex ante and ex post envy-freeness on polytope resources
• The fractional Boston random assignment rule and its axiomatic characterization
• Size versus truncation robustness in the assignment problem
• Guaranteed size ratio of ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanisms in the assignment problem
• Axiomatic characterizations of the constrained probabilistic serial mechanism
• A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain
• Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: two impossibility results
• Convex strategyproofness with an application to the probabilistic serial mechanism
• A simple characterization of assignment mechanisms on set constraints
• Efficient lottery design
• Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences
• Extended random assignment mechanisms on a family of good sets
• Submodular optimization views on the random assignment problem
• Multi resource allocation with partial preferences
• Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem
• Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model
• A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism
• Overlapping multiple object assignments
• Simultaneous eating algorithm and greedy algorithm in assignment problems
• Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule
• Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach
• The object allocation problem with random priorities
• Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object
• Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: a generalization of the serial rule and its characterization
• A characterization of the extended serial correspondence
• Constrained random matching
• An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism
• Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects
• An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism
• Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
• A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
• Efficient rules for probabilistic assignment
• Fair solutions to the random assignment problem
• On wastefulness of random assignments in discrete allocation problems
• The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments
• Assigning agents to a line
• Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment
• The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
• Strategy-proof allocation with outside option
• On characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism involving incentive and invariance properties
• When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?
• Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
• Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles
• Size versus fairness in the assignment problem
• Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms
• Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation
• Random assignment: redefining the serial rule
• Characterizations of the cumulative offer process
• Tight social welfare approximation of probabilistic serial
• Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment
• The extended serial correspondence on a rich preference domain

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