Random assignment: redefining the serial rule
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Cites work
- A characterization of the extended serial correspondence
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- Allocation of divisible goods under lexicographic preferences
- Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule
- Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
- Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
Cited in
(27)- Guaranteed size ratio of ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanisms in the assignment problem
- Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach
- A simple characterization of assignment mechanisms on set constraints
- On slots' scheduling
- Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems
- A characterization of the extended serial correspondence
- A marriage matching mechanism menagerie
- Random assignments of bundles
- Constrained random matching
- Submodular optimization views on the random assignment problem
- A note on object allocation under lexicographic preferences
- The fractional Boston random assignment rule and its axiomatic characterization
- Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object
- Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains
- Extended random assignment mechanisms on a family of good sets
- Efficient rules for probabilistic assignment
- Corrigendum to: ``Random assignment: redefining the serial rule
- When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?
- The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints
- Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment
- Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule
- On the consistency of random serial dictatorship
- Characterizing a probabilistic version of the Boston mechanism under weak priorities
- Random serial dictatorship and ordinally efficient contracts
- Size versus fairness in the assignment problem
- Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
- Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms
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