A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
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Cites work
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Cited in
(88)- Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems
- On slots' scheduling
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- Fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences
- Corrigendum to: ``Random assignment: redefining the serial rule
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- The extended serial correspondence on a rich preference domain
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