Parametrized algorithms for random serial dictatorship
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Publication:477775
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2014.07.002zbMATH Open1308.91052arXiv1403.0974OpenAlexW2171419939MaRDI QIDQ477775FDOQ477775
Authors: Haris Aziz, Julián Mestre
Publication date: 9 December 2014
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: Voting and assignment are two of the most fundamental settings in social choice theory. For both settings, random serial dictatorship (RSD) is a well-known rule that satisfies anonymity, ex post efficiency, and strategyproofness. Recently, it was shown that computing the resulting probabilities is #P-complete both in the voting and assignment setting. In this paper, we study RSD from a parametrized complexity perspective. More specifically, we present efficient algorithms to compute the RSD probabilities under the condition that the number of agent types, alternatives, or objects is bounded.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1403.0974
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Cites Work
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