Parametrized algorithms for random serial dictatorship

From MaRDI portal
Publication:477775

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2014.07.002zbMATH Open1308.91052arXiv1403.0974OpenAlexW2171419939MaRDI QIDQ477775FDOQ477775


Authors: Haris Aziz, Julián Mestre Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 9 December 2014

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Voting and assignment are two of the most fundamental settings in social choice theory. For both settings, random serial dictatorship (RSD) is a well-known rule that satisfies anonymity, ex post efficiency, and strategyproofness. Recently, it was shown that computing the resulting probabilities is #P-complete both in the voting and assignment setting. In this paper, we study RSD from a parametrized complexity perspective. More specifically, we present efficient algorithms to compute the RSD probabilities under the condition that the number of agent types, alternatives, or objects is bounded.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1403.0974




Recommendations



Cites Work


Cited In (4)





This page was built for publication: Parametrized algorithms for random serial dictatorship

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q477775)