A constructive proof of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2007.09.008zbMath1140.91342OpenAlexW2088756177MaRDI QIDQ938066

Mihai Manea

Publication date: 18 August 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.09.008

zbMATH Keywords

ordinal efficiencystrict acyclicitythe ordinal efficiency welfare theoremweak representations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items (15)

Fair solutions to the random assignment problem ⋮ Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism ⋮ An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism ⋮ An efficiency theorem for incompletely known preferences ⋮ Simultaneous eating algorithm and greedy algorithm in assignment problems ⋮ On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model ⋮ Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities ⋮ Assigning agents to a line ⋮ A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism ⋮ Popular mixed matchings ⋮ Efficiency under a combination of ordinal and cardinal information on preferences ⋮ Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems ⋮ Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects ⋮ Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions ⋮ Efficient rules for probabilistic assignment

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
• A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
• Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
• On cores and indivisibility
• Random serial dictatorship and ordinally efficient contracts
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.

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