Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2019.11.003MaRDI QIDQ2173167zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Josué Ortega

Publication date 22 April 2020

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.10897, https://pureadmin.qub.ac.uk/ws/files/190835367/ManuscriptRevised.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

dichotomous preferencesLorenz dominancecompetitive equilibrium with equal incomesmulti-unit assignment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Abstract: I study the problem of allocating objects among agents without using money. Agents can receive several objects and have dichotomous preferences, meaning that they either consider objects to be acceptable or not. In this setup, the egalitarian solution is more appealing than the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes because it is Lorenz dominant, unique in utilities, and group strategy-proof. Moreover, it can be adapted to satisfy a new fairness axiom that arises naturally in this context. Both solutions are disjoint.

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Cited in

(3)

• Approximating Nash social welfare under binary XOS and binary subadditive valuations
• Task preference-based bottleneck assignment problem
• The price of equity with binary valuations and few agent types

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