Dividing bads under additive utilities

DOI10.1007/s00355-018-1157-xzbMath1410.91303OpenAlexW2896904690WikidataQ60301533 ScholiaQ60301533MaRDI QIDQ2417409

Elena Yanovskaia, Anna Bogomolnaia, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Hervé Moulin

Publication date: 12 June 2019

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1157-x

zbMATH Keywords

utilityegalitarian rulecompetitive ruledivision of bads

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items

Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences, When dividing mixed manna is easier than dividing goods: competitive equilibria with a constant number of chores, Fair division of goods in the shadow of market values, Fair division of indivisible goods: recent progress and open questions, Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources, A noncooperative foundation of the competitive divisions for bads, Allocating contiguous blocks of indivisible chores fairly, Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets

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