A noncooperative foundation of the competitive divisions for bads

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105253zbMath1461.91157OpenAlexW3156062004MaRDI QIDQ2025043

Marco Mariotti, Quan Wen

Publication date: 11 May 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105253

zbMATH Keywords

Markov perfect equilibriumcompetitive divisionmixed manna

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

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• The Bargaining Problem
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• Multilateral Bargaining
• Intra Firm Bargaining and Shapley Values

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