Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences
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Publication:682485
DOI10.1007/S00355-016-0986-8zbMATH Open1392.91109OpenAlexW2252361264WikidataQ59471729 ScholiaQ59471729MaRDI QIDQ682485FDOQ682485
Authors: Tomoya Kazumura, Shigehiro Serizawa 
Publication date: 2 February 2018
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0986-8
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- Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects
- Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
efficiencystrategy-proofnessminimum price Walrasian rulemulti-demand preferencesnon-quasi-linear preferencesunit-demand preferences
Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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Cited In (13)
- Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects
- Provision-after-wait with preferences ordered by difference: tighter complexity and better approximation
- Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders
- Static and Dynamic Assignment Models with Multiple Objectives, and Some Remarks on Organization Design
- Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences
- Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
- Efficiency and strategy-proofness in multi-unit object allocation problems with non-quasi-linear preferences: a positive result
- Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity
- Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule
- Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
- Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment
- On finding and detecting efficient assignments in the case of multiple inputs and outputs
- Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule
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