Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences

DOI10.1007/s00355-016-0986-8zbMath1392.91109OpenAlexW2252361264WikidataQ59471729 ScholiaQ59471729MaRDI QIDQ682485

Shigehiro Serizawa, Tomoya Kazumura

Publication date: 2 February 2018

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0986-8

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencystrategy-proofnessminimum price Walrasian rulemulti-demand preferencesnon-quasi-linear preferencesunit-demand preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (6)

Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders ⋮ Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects ⋮ Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment ⋮ Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule ⋮ Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity ⋮ Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences

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