Equity and the Vickrey allocation rule on general preference domains
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Publication:404745
DOI10.1007/s00355-013-0752-0zbMath1302.91101OpenAlexW1965127939MaRDI QIDQ404745
Publication date: 4 September 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0752-0
Related Items (5)
Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions ⋮ An introduction to mechanized reasoning ⋮ Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences ⋮ Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule ⋮ Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
Cites Work
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- The questionnaire topology on some spaces of economic preferences
- Vickrey allocation rule with income effect
- Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
- An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear
- Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction
- Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations
- Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- Feasible and Continuous Implementation
- Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule
- Continuity Properties of the Core of a Market
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