Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105036zbMath1447.91036OpenAlexW3014541001MaRDI QIDQ785519
Debasis Mishra, Tomoya Kazumura, Shigehiro Serizawa
Publication date: 7 August 2020
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105036
strategy-proofnessmulti-object auctionex-post revenue maximizationminimum Walrasian equilibrium price mechanismnon-quasilinear preferences
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Related Items (5)
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