Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
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Publication:4614956
DOI10.3982/ECTA12618zbMath1420.91090arXiv1409.4150OpenAlexW2617513782MaRDI QIDQ4614956
Alan Deckelbaum, Constantinos Daskalakis, Christos Tzamos
Publication date: 1 February 2019
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1409.4150
Inequalities; stochastic orderings (60E15) Applications of optimal control and differential games (49N90) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)
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