Axiomatizations of second price auctions with a reserve price

DOI10.1111/J.1742-7363.2013.12018.XMaRDI QIDQ4583984zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Toyotaka Sakai

Publication date 29 August 2018

Published in International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2013.12018.x

zbMATH Keywords

market designstrategy-proofnessreserve pricesecond price auctionno-trade rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(10)

• Collusion-proof and fair auctions
• Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
• Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices
• Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
• Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects
• An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear
• No-trade in second-price auctions with entry costs and secret reserve prices
• Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values
• Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects
• Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money

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