Axiomatizations of second price auctions with a reserve price
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Publication:4583984
DOI10.1111/J.1742-7363.2013.12018.XzbMATH Open1416.91140OpenAlexW1790172711MaRDI QIDQ4583984FDOQ4583984
Publication date: 29 August 2018
Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2013.12018.x
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- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects
- Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values
- Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money
- Collusion-proof and fair auctions
- An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear
- Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects
- No-trade in second-price auctions with entry costs and secret reserve prices
- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices
- Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
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