Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices
This article introduces serial dictatorship mechanisms with individual reservation prices for the allocation of indivisible objects. The authors begin with an introduction to markets in which the resources to be allocated are overdemanded and consider the reasons for the existence of such markets. After a presentation of the literature review, the authors present a model which includes serial dictatorships, reservation prices and priority ordering, before providing insights on the application of the model to real-life situations such as healthcare markets.
- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects
- Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
- Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources
- Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
- Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
- Axiomatizations of second price auctions with a reserve price
- Axioms for deferred acceptance
- Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
- Consistency in house allocation problems
- Consistent house allocation
- Jumping the queue: an experiment on procedural preferences
- No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
- Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
- Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
- Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
- Vickrey allocation rule with income effect
- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects
- Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects
- Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources
- Optimizing over serial dictatorships
- Sequential dictatorship rules in multi-unit object assignment problems with money
- Endowments-swapping-proof object reallocation with transfers
This page was built for publication: Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2206002)
