Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices
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Recommendations
- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects
- Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
- Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources
- Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
- Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
Cites work
- Axiomatizations of second price auctions with a reserve price
- Axioms for deferred acceptance
- Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
- Consistency in house allocation problems
- Consistent house allocation
- Jumping the queue: an experiment on procedural preferences
- No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
- Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
- Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
- Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- Vickrey allocation rule with income effect
Cited in
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