Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices
DOI10.1007/S00199-019-01223-6zbMATH Open1471.91204OpenAlexW3008809765MaRDI QIDQ2206002FDOQ2206002
Alexandru Nichifor, Bettina Klaus
Publication date: 21 October 2020
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hec.unil.ch/attachments/deep/series/2016/17.07.pdf
consistencystrategy-proofnessserial dictatorshipaxiomatic characterizationpriority orderingindividual reservation prices
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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Cited In (2)
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