Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule
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Publication:4586011
DOI10.3982/TE1470zbMath1395.91236OpenAlexW2526609439MaRDI QIDQ4586011
Shuhei Morimoto, Shigehiro Serizawa
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1470
non-quasi-linear preferencessimultaneous ascending auctionheterogeneous objectsminimum price Walrasian equilibriumstrategy-proofness, efficiency
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