A speedy auction using approximated bidders' preferences

DOI10.1007/s10479-019-03461-2zbMath1437.91219OpenAlexW2990943866WikidataQ126807524 ScholiaQ126807524MaRDI QIDQ2173118

Jim Ingebretsen Carlson

Publication date: 22 April 2020

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-019-03461-2

zbMATH Keywords

combinatorial auctionnon-quasi-linear preferencesapproximate auctionapproximated preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model
• The private value single item bisection auction
• On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
• Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
• On a dynamic auction mechanism for a bilateral assignment problem
• The English auction with differentiated commodities
• Multi-item Vickrey-English-Dutch auctions
• Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Equilibria and Indivisibilities: Gross Substitutes and Complements
• A Double-Track Adjustment Process for Discrete Markets With Substitutes and Complements
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule

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