A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems

DOI10.1111/IJET.12306MaRDI QIDQ6074886zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yu Zhou, Youngsub Chun, Shigehiro Serizawa

Publication date 19 October 2023

Published in International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12306

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencystrategy-proofnessindividual rationalitysingle-peakednessslot allocation problemVickrey rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• A characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem
• A graph theoretic approach to the slot allocation problem
• Assigning agents to a line
• Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
• Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
• Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction
• Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
• Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogeneous objects
• Fair queueing
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Incentives in Teams
• No-envy, solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
• Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
• Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule
• Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule
• Vickrey allocation rule with income effect

Cited in

(1)

• A graph theoretic approach to the slot allocation problem

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