Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction

DOI10.1007/S00199-006-0130-6MaRDI QIDQ2385108zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Soo Hong Chew, Shigehiro Serizawa

Publication date 11 October 2007

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13554

zbMATH Keywords

inductionstrategy-proofnesssimultaneous ascending auctionsheterogeneous commoditiessmoothly connected domainsVickrey combinatorial auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• A Note on the Characterization of Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Incentives in Teams

Cited in

(18)

• Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains
• Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions
• A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems
• Equity and the Vickrey allocation rule on general preference domains
• Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
• Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
• Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects
• Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money
• Overbidding and underbidding in package allocation problems
• Joint misrepresentation with bribes
• Ordinal allocation
• Non-bossiness
• Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism
• Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction
• Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions
• Vickrey allocation rule with income effect
• On Vickrey-type auction procedures
• An introduction to mechanized reasoning

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