Overbidding and underbidding in package allocation problems

DOI10.1007/S00355-024-01506-5zbMATH Open1546.91143MaRDI QIDQ6580468FDOQ6580468

Authors: Marina Núñez, Francisco Robles 

Publication date: 29 July 2024

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

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• A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes
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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Core-selecting package auctions
• Combinatorial auctions. Foreword by Vernon L. Smith.
• The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
• The package assignment model.
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction
• Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents
• Package Auctions and Exchanges
• Ascending prices and package bidding: further experimental analysis

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