Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA
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Publication:2268110
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Cites work
- A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions
- Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
- Auction design with costly preference elicitation
- Auctions of homogeneous goods with increasing returns: experimental comparison of alternative ``Dutch auctions
- Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions
- Computationally manageable combinational auctions
- Hierarchical package bidding: a paper \& pencil combinatorial auction
- Incentives in Teams
- Learning under limited information.
- Payoff assessments without probabilities: a simple dynamic model of choice
- Robustness of the incentive compatible combinatorial auction
Cited in
(12)- Connected price dynamics with revealed preferences and Auctioneer's discretion in VCG combinatorial auction
- Ascending prices and package bidding: further experimental analysis
- Overbidding and underbidding in package allocation problems
- Hierarchical package bidding: a paper \& pencil combinatorial auction
- A study of auction mechanisms for multilateral procurement based on subgradient and bundle methods
- Scheduling with package auctions
- Matching in the large: an experimental study
- Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study
- Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents
- Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study
- Multi-object auctions with resale: theory and experiment
- On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions
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