Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.10.007zbMATH Open1200.91063OpenAlexW2159805194MaRDI QIDQ2268110FDOQ2268110
Authors: Yan Chen, Kan Takeuchi 
Publication date: 10 March 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.007
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Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Experimental studies (91A90)
Cites Work
- Computationally manageable combinational auctions
- Incentives in Teams
- Auctions of homogeneous goods with increasing returns: experimental comparison of alternative ``Dutch auctions
- A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions
- Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions
- Hierarchical package bidding: a paper \& pencil combinatorial auction
- Payoff assessments without probabilities: a simple dynamic model of choice
- Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
- Robustness of the incentive compatible combinatorial auction
- Auction design with costly preference elicitation
- Learning under limited information.
Cited In (12)
- Connected price dynamics with revealed preferences and Auctioneer's discretion in VCG combinatorial auction
- Ascending prices and package bidding: further experimental analysis
- Overbidding and underbidding in package allocation problems
- A study of auction mechanisms for multilateral procurement based on subgradient and bundle methods
- Hierarchical package bidding: a paper \& pencil combinatorial auction
- Scheduling with package auctions
- Matching in the large: an experimental study
- Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study
- Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study
- Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents
- Multi-object auctions with resale: theory and experiment
- On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions
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