Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.10.007MaRDI QIDQ2268110zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yan Chen, Kan Takeuchi

Publication date 10 March 2010

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.007

zbMATH Keywords

experimental economicscombinatorial auctionsiBEA auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cites work

• A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
• Auction design with costly preference elicitation
• Auctions of homogeneous goods with increasing returns: experimental comparison of alternative ``Dutch auctions
• Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions
• Computationally manageable combinational auctions
• Hierarchical package bidding: a paper \& pencil combinatorial auction
• Incentives in Teams
• Learning under limited information.
• Payoff assessments without probabilities: a simple dynamic model of choice
• Robustness of the incentive compatible combinatorial auction

Cited in

(12)

• Connected price dynamics with revealed preferences and Auctioneer's discretion in VCG combinatorial auction
• Ascending prices and package bidding: further experimental analysis
• Overbidding and underbidding in package allocation problems
• Hierarchical package bidding: a paper \& pencil combinatorial auction
• A study of auction mechanisms for multilateral procurement based on subgradient and bundle methods
• Scheduling with package auctions
• Matching in the large: an experimental study
• Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study
• Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents
• Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study
• Multi-object auctions with resale: theory and experiment
• On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions

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Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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