Hierarchical package bidding: a paper \& pencil combinatorial auction
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2008.02.013zbMATH Open1200.91066OpenAlexW2137715325WikidataQ59938114 ScholiaQ59938114MaRDI QIDQ993791FDOQ993791
Authors: Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt 
Publication date: 20 September 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/42542/1/2010_GoereeJ_iewwp436.pdf
Recommendations
- Decomposing combinatorial auctions and set packing problems
- A pricing scheme for combinatorial auctions based on bundle sizes
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1738678
- Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions
- Combinatorial auctions: a survey
- Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA
- A new bidding framework for combinatorial e-auctions
- Efficient constrained combinatorial auctions
Abstract computational complexity for mathematical programming problems (90C60) Experimental studies (91A90) Discrete location and assignment (90B80)
Cites Work
Cited In (6)
- An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction
- Ascending prices and package bidding: further experimental analysis
- Shapley value based pricing for auctions and exchanges
- Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study
- Combinatorial clock auctions: price direction and performance
- Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA
This page was built for publication: Hierarchical package bidding: a paper \& pencil combinatorial auction
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q993791)
